

SECRET EYES ONLY
(CLASSIFICATION)

DDP
80/562-1981
DTR-
ER 62-3455

ACTION MEMORANDUM

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

Action Memorandum No. B-8

Date 22 May 1962

TO : DD/P, DD/S

SUBJECT :

REFERENCE:

[Redacted Box]

25X1

DCI requests a five-minute speech be prepared for him to deliver to include the importance of the course, and the Agency's support for it, and referring briefly to Agency activities in the counter-insurgency field.

Please nominate a candidate to represent the DCI should he be unable to attend.

[Redacted Box]
Executive Assistant

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SUSPENSE DATE:

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Executive	62-3870
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2-2593

2 - JUN 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Assistant to the Director

SUBJECT: Response to Action Memorandum B-8
dated 22 May 1962

1. Attached hereto is a draft of the speech requested in subject Action Memorandum.
2. Since action was also assigned to DD/S, we got together with him and the attachment reflects the views of both DD/P and DD/S components.
3. In further response to your request, in the event that the Director should be unable to attend, it is recommended that General Carter make the speech.

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Acting Deputy Director (Plans)

Attachment: draft

DDP-1

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PROPOSED REMARKS

BY

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

AT THE OPENING OF



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As Director of Central Intelligence, I can assure you that we face no more pressing national security problem now, and for the foreseeable future, than the continuing threat to the internal security of the less developed and emerging states by Communist inspired subversive insurgency.

The Sino-Soviet Bloc has long recognized and acted upon the principle that dissidence is inherent in the political, economic and sociological "modernization" of the less developed and emerging states. Through the apparatus of international communism, Bloc Countries identify emergent dissidence, and inspire, and support its development to levels of subversive insurgency and armed insurrection, with Communist take-over as the ultimate goal. Bloc successes in this respect have presented the United States with some new dimensions of an old threat, not only in Asia,

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the Near East and Africa, but also in the Western Hemisphere.

As the military and economic strength of the U.S. and other Free World Powers continue to overbalance that of the Sino-Soviet Bloc the Communists are becoming increasingly disinclined to risk overt external aggression. Far less risky for them, and more dangerous for us, is the threat they continue to present to the internal security of the underdeveloped countries by subversive means and in furtherance of their own announced world-wide aims and objectives for an international Communist society. We can, therefore, look forward to an intensification of Sino-Soviet Bloc efforts to exploit vulnerabilities to subversive insurgency wherever they can be found.

Our own national security interests impel us to take measures to assist the underdeveloped countries in meeting this threat since most of them are ill prepared to prevent or combat subversive insurgency unaided.

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In view of the seriousness of this national security problem I am gratified at the new vigor the President has instilled in all of us, in approaching this problem and the "command emphasis" he has placed upon the necessity to deal with it.

The efforts of CIA and other Government agencies need to be more closely coordinated in order to bring the full weight of the U.S. effort to bear on our counterinsurgency operations.

CIA's role in counterinsurgency is varied. Our resources are brought to bear at home and overseas in both the preventive and combat phases of counterinsurgency operations. On the intelligence side, and through the United States Intelligence Board, we are aligning our collection and production effort to provide the intelligence needed for counterinsurgency planning and operations. On the operational side, our role is two-fold: through espionage,

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counterintelligence and various types of covert action to assist local governments to reduce and eliminate the root causes of dissidence before it reaches the explosive stages, and, to strengthen their capabilities to suppress insurgency, should it arise; and second to expose and negate Communist efforts to exploit such situations to their own advantage.

Early concerted U.S. action may prevent insurgency from reaching advanced stages such as it has in Laos and Vietnam where, incidentally the Country Team concept is working admirably.

Achievements to date in the U.S. crisis program for South Vietnam indicate that the task, although highly complex, is not insurmountable.

The integrated program being conducted there, in support of the South Vietnamese is, I believe, a useful prototype for all to study.

It is for these reasons in particular that this interdepartmentally sponsored course in "Current Problems of the Developing Areas"

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in which you are enrolled holds its greatest promise.

The course has been excellently ordered to identify through study the factors which contribute to the main problems confronting us in the nations with which we are vitally concerned. The format also suggests that each of you will have ample opportunity to address yourselves to alternative solutions and subject them to class discussion, a form of approach which I highly approve.

I am pleased that you, who will be involved in the planning and execution of U.S. counterinsurgency operations, have this opportunity to prepare yourselves for the work that lies ahead. The President is concerned that all of us who have operational responsibilities in this field will employ our respective resources with maximum effort. To achieve this goal we need to know the nature of the problem we are trying to solve, and what our several capabilities are, and how to correlate our mutual efforts towards these ends.

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The Central Intelligence Agency has participated in the development of this course and is represented both on the faculty and in the student body. I would like you to consider these CIA Officers as my personal representatives. They are present here to help you understand CIA's role and mission in support of U.S. counterinsurgency operations, and to obtain similar knowledge and understanding from you.

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM			
UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL	
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP			
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	INITIALS	DATE
1	DYR	[Signature]	24 May 62
2	DYR	IKB	25 MAY 1962
3	C/OS (action 1	Rnd	25
4	thru me.		
	[Redacted]		
6	C/OS		
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	ACTION	<input type="checkbox"/>	DIRECT REPLY
<input type="checkbox"/>	APPROVAL	<input type="checkbox"/>	DISPATCH
<input type="checkbox"/>	COMMENT	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	RETURN
<input type="checkbox"/>	CONCURRENCE	<input type="checkbox"/>	INFORMATION
<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	PREPARE REPLY
<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	RECOMMENDATION
<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	SIGNATURE
Remarks:			
<p>To: As neither you nor Bob, nor [Redacted] have anything else to do, would one of you please let me have a draft speech by 1600 on Monday, the 28th (so I can try it out on Sir before he departs for [Redacted] Tues A.M.).</p>			
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER			
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.			DATE
		SECRET	

TO: Director of Training

ROOM NO.

1D0418

BUILDING

Headquarters

REMARKS:

Mr. Baird:

This implies that both DD/P and DD/S are being asked to prepare speeches and nominate alternates for the DCI. We will straighten this out. In the meantime, would appreciate it if someone in OTR could prepare a draft five-minute speech as requested.

STAT

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Suspense: 30 May

FROM:

EA-DDS

ROOM NO.

BUILDING

EXTENSION

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USE ONLY

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

DC/CA/S

2 D 18

NO.

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S
INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1. Acting Deputy Director (Plans)
3 C 20102
June
142.
3. Executive Assistant to the Director
7 D 5617

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ER

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